By Thomas J. Ford

Rfile approximately German oil creation and purchases in the course of WW2.

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Record approximately German oil construction and purchases in the course of WW2.

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Extra resources for Oil as a Factor in the German War Effort, 1933-1945

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The material for these lines was part of the pipeline captured in France which had been intended to connect Donges and Montargis. This material was supplied and partly laid by the Germans, but the lines were owned and operated, as part of their monopoly, by the Roumanian State Railways. The two extra lines more than doubled the pipeline capacity between Ploesti and Giurgiu, and greatly eased the problems of rail transport of oil from Ploesti by permitting increased despatches by Danube barges and by rail from Giurgiu.

4) 8. A report of the Zentrale Planung shows that total oil consumption of the armed forces in 1941 averaged about 400,000 tons a month. Luftwaffe con­ sumption was at a level of about 100,000 tons a month with a peak figure of 1 37,000 tons in July. Naval consumption remained steady at about 100,000 tons a month. (5) 9. This document also estimated the optimum requirements of the army in 1941 at 240,000 tons a month but admits that the army only received an average of 185,000 tons a month. However, the difference between the desirable and actual receipts of the German Army was only in part due to the deficit between produc­ tion and consumption; supply and transport difficulties due to ''the depth and length of the Russian front were at least as much responsible.

Everyone has confirmed that Command High The thought it would be over by October 1941. " The planners were prepared for a rate of oilconsumption twice as high as normal needs for the short time the campaign was expected to last. 6. Based upon these optimistic expectations the hopes that sufficient liquid fuels would be provided for the forces in Russia appeared to be well grounded. Before the campaign began current production of motor gasoline and diesel oil was running at a rate little below that of estimated consumption and was backed by reserve stocks that were in excess of those available in 1939.

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